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Abstract
We propose a new model for policy analysis of banking crises (or systemic bank
runs) based on the monetary framework developed by Lagos and Wright (2005).
If banks cannot enforce loan repayment and have to secure loans by collateral, a
banking crisis due to coordination failure among depositors can occur in response to
a sunspot shock, and the banks become insolvent as a result of the bank runs. The
model is tractable and easily embedded into a standard business cycle model. The
model naturally makes a distinction between money and goods, while most of the
existing banking models do not. This distinction enables us to clarify further the
workings of banking crises and crisis management policies. In particular, we may
be able to use this framework to compare the eﬃcacy of ﬁscal stimulus, monetary
easing, and bank reforms as recovery eﬀorts from the current global ﬁnancial crisis.
Keywords: Monetary theory, bank runs, demand deposits, business cycles.
JEL Classiﬁcations: E32, E42, G01.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to construct a tractable model of banking crises, which can be
embedded in standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. In order
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 to be compatible with a standard business cycle model, the model should distinguish
nominal money (i.e., cash) from goods. It is diﬃcult to incorporate the existing banking
theory (such as Diamond-Dybvig framework) into standard DSGE models because the
existing models do not distinguish between cash and goods in a tractable way. A model
with a distinction between cash and goods is expected to enable us to clarify the workings
of banking crises further. For example, in our model we can naturally explain the reason
why a banking crisis decreases the value of the bank asset (see the incomplete loan
enforcement model in Section 4), while the existing models exogenously assume that the
early liquidation of investments by banks is costly. A model of banking crises that can be
easily integrated in the standard DSGE models may enable the analysis of banking crises
and ordinary business cycles in a uniﬁed framework. It may also enable the presentation
of a seamless policy analysis on monetary and banking policies.
Our model builds on the monetary framework developed by Lagos and Wright (2005).
Naturally, the bank deposit in our model is assumed to be primarily a substitute for
money, which gives payment services to the depositors. The bank deposit in this paper
represents not only bank deposit in reality, but also various debt liabilities of ﬁnancial
intermediaries, i.e., borrowings and bonds issued by banks, investment banks, and hedge
funds.
In Section 2, we construct the basic model with loan enforcement and no bank in-
solvency shock. There are no bank runs in the basic model, when the deposit rate is
positive. In Section 3, we introduce a macroeconomic shock which renders the banks in-
solvent. This is a model with a bank insolvency shock and loan enforcement. A banking
crisis occurs when the bank insolvency shock hits the economy. Policy implications are
(1) the suspension of convertibility may amplify the severity of the banking crisis, since
this policy does not restore the payment activity of banks; (2) The bank reform to restore
the solvency of the banking system is costly, but improves social welfare signiﬁcantly;
(3) Lender of Last Resort (LLR) lending by the central bank is not suﬃcient to stop
a banking crisis. In Section 4, we construct a model with incomplete loan enforcement
without a bank insolvency shock. In this model, bank runs due to coordination failure
2among depositors can occur even if there is no real shock that renders banks insolvent.
Therefore, bank runs can occur as a sunspot equilibrium due to panic in the market, and
the banks become insolvent as a result of the bank runs. In the incomplete loan enforce-
ment model, it is shown that the bank reforms to restore the solvency of the banking
system is the optimal policy for economic recovery from the banking crisis, while both
ﬁscal stimulus and monetary easing are not suﬃciently eﬀective to resolve the crisis.
Although the policy of bank reforms appears to be highly costly ex ante, its cost turns
out to be zero ex post, precisely because the asset price responds positively to the policy.
Related Literature: There are several models of banking with distinctions between
money and goods. Champ, Smith and Williamson (1996) analyze a model in which
bank notes can be circulated as a means of payment or inside money. In their model,
bank notes are circulated only if the government allows the issuance of bank notes, while
we are interested in the case where the agents spontaneously determine not to accept
bank notes as money even if the government allows their issuance. McAndrews and
Roberds (1995, 1999) also analyze the payment intermediation by banks, but they do
not formally analyze the disruption of payment intermediation. Allen and Gale (1998)
show a welfare-improving role of ﬁat money during a banking crisis, while the money in
their model works as a store of value, not as a means of payment. In the present paper,
we focus on the payment services provided by the banking sector as a key driving factor
of banking crises.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we show the basic model
with loan enforcement and no bank insolvency shock. We show that there are no bank
runs in the basic model. In Section 3, we introduce a bank insolvency shock that induces
bank runs. We specify the equilibrium with bank runs and discuss policy implications. In
Section 4, we present a modiﬁed model with incomplete loan enforcement and collateral
constraint. We show that bank runs due to coordination failure can occur in response
to a sunspot shock and the banks become insolvent as a result of the runs. We com-
pare ﬁscal and monetary policies and bank reforms as recovery eﬀorts from the current
3ﬁnancial crisis in our framework. Section 5 concludes. In Appendix B we modify the
incomplete loan enforcement model of Section 4 such that idiosyncratic shocks induce
runs on individual banks due to coordination failure. We also show that individual bank
runs due to idiosyncratic shocks are naturally contagious.
2 Basic Model
The model is a variant of the monetary economy with banks constructed by Berentsen,
Camera and Waller (2007), which is based on the framework developed by Lagos and
Wright (2005). The main diﬀerence of our model from theirs is that banks can perform
credit creation, that is, the banks accept deposits and make loans such that the size of
their balance sheets becomes several times larger than that of their cash reserves.
2.1 Environment
The model is a closed economy ` a la Lagos and Wright (2005), in which there are continua
of two types of agents, sellers and buyers, who live forever. Time is discrete and continues
from 0 to inﬁnity: t = 0,1,··· ,∞. The intertemporal discount factor for the utility ﬂow
is β for both agents, where 0 < β < 1. The measures of sellers and buyers are n and
1−n respectively. In each date t, there are two perfectly competitive markets that open
sequentially: the day market and the night market. In the day market sellers and buyers
trade the intermediate goods, taking the market price as given. A seller can produce and
sell the intermediate goods. A seller who produces q units of intermediate goods incurs
the utility cost of c(q), where c′(q) > 0, c′′(q) > 0 and c(0) = 0. The goods trade during
the day market anonymously, but trades during the night market are not anonymous; an
agent cannot identify her trading partner during the day market, but she can during the
night market. Since all goods trade in the day market anonymously, trade credit between
sellers and buyers is not available and sellers require immediate compensation, meaning
payment with cash.1 Consumption takes place only in the night market. There is also a
1In this paper, we exclude the possibility that bank deposits are accepted as a means of payment or
as inside money. We assume that a buyer’s transaction record with her bank is also private information
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lived, that is, they are born in the date-(t − 1) night market and are liquidated in the
date-t night market. The banks born in the date-(t−1) night market accept deposits and
make loans in that market, and they collect the loan repayments and pay out deposits in
the date-t night market before liquidation. The banks eat all remaining proﬁts when they
are liquidated. The banks born in the date-(t − 1) night market have a record-keeping
technology such that they can identify their depositors and borrowers in the date-t night
market. This record-keeping technology is not available for sellers or buyers.
In the night market, all sellers and buyers produce consumption goods from labor
input by a linear production technology which transforms h units of labor into h units of
consumption goods, while the labor supply generates h units of disutility. All agents get
utility U(x) from consumption of x units, with U′(x) > 0, U′(0) = +∞, U′(+∞) = 0,
and U′′(x) ≤ 0. This setting for the night market is standard in the Lagos-Wright
framework, which makes the distribution of money holdings degenerate at the beginning
of a period. On the other hand, at the beginning of the night market, buyers are endowed
with one unit of the production machine that is used to produce the consumption goods
from the intermediate goods. Buyers, sellers, and banks trade the machines and the
intermediate goods in the competitive market, and the borrowers (i.e., buyers and sellers)
repay their bank loans (in the form of the consumption goods). After the borrowers
make loan repayments, y units of the consumption goods are produced from q units
of the intermediate goods and k units of the machines by a Cobb-Douglas production
technology: y = Ak1−θqθ, where 0 < θ < 1. After the production of the consumption
goods, the machines depreciate fully. Then bank deposits are paid out and banks are
liquidated.
We assume that there exists a central bank in this economy. The central bank
controls the supply of ﬁat currency. The amount of cash in the economy is given by
Mt = γt−1Mt−1, where γt(> 0) is the growth rate of money and also the inﬂation rate in
unavailable to a seller, and the seller cannot know the ﬁnancial health of the buyer’s bank. Consequently,
the seller feels a risk that the buyer’s bank may fail to transfer money to the seller’s account. Therefore,
a buyer’s bank deposit is not accepted as a payment instrument by a seller.
5a steady state equilibrium, which we focus on in this paper, and Mt denotes the per capita
money stock on date t. All agents receive identical lump-sum transfers (γt−1−1)Mt−1 at
the beginning of the date-(t−1) night market, in which sellers, buyers, and banks trade
cash to determine their cash holdings that they carry over to the date-t day market.
Record keeping and demand deposits: We assume as Berentsen et al. (2007)
that only the banks have a technology that allows record keeping of ﬁnancial transactions
but not trading histories in the goods market. Since the banks live for one period, they
keep records of ﬁnancial histories only for one period. We also assume that there is no
cost for the banks to keep ﬁnancial records. Thanks to this record-keeping technology,
the banks can accept demand deposits and make loans. In this paper we assume that a
demand deposit is an asset that is primarily designed to be a substitute for cash and to
facilitate payment activities of depositors. An agent who holds cash enjoys the following
two conveniences in payment activity: (1) She can use cash at anytime she wants, and (2)
there is no uncertainty in the amount of money (i.e., cash) that she can use in the units
of the ﬁat currency, because the amount of cash is by deﬁnition preﬁxed in the units of
the ﬁat currency. Since these two features are very essential advantages of holding cash
and the demand deposit is designed to be a substitute for cash, banks naturally oﬀer
these two features to their depositors. So we deﬁne the demand deposit as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 The demand deposit contract is a contract such that (1) the bank commits
itself to exchange the demand deposit for cash on demand at anytime; and (2) the ex-
change rate between the demand deposit and cash is preﬁxed by contract as a function of
the time period of deposit.
In our model, the demandability of a bank deposit is assumed as a necessary feature of
the asset called bank deposit, while in the framework of Diamond and Rajan (2001), for
example, it is a device to discipline the bankers in the principal-agent relationship.
Enforcement of loan repayment: We assume that in this basic model, the banks
can completely enforce their borrowers (i.e., sellers or buyers) to repay their bank loans.
6There is no risk of default of bank borrowers. In Section 4, we consider the case where the
banks cannot enforce loan repayment completely and have to secure loans by collateral.
Sequential service constraint and bank failures: In the day market, some depos-
itors withdraw their demand deposits and in the same market other depositors deposit
additional cash into the banks. Although the banks are obliged by the demand deposit
contract to pay the full amount of the deposit on demand, the banks may run out of their
cash reserves under some circumstances. We say that the banks are “bankrupt” when
they run out of cash. We assume the following process for the bankruptcy procedure
for the banks.2 When a bank runs out of cash, the remaining depositors who want to
withdraw their deposits in the day market cannot withdraw, instead they can simply
hold their deposits until the night market. In the night market, the bank is liquidated
after it collects loans, and the bank assets are divided among the remaining depositors at
a pro rata basis. In the basic model, deposits are fully repaid in the night market, since
there is no possibility of impairment of bank assets. Deﬁnition 1 and this bankruptcy
procedure naturally imply that the demand deposit contract is subject to the sequential
service constraint (or the ﬁrst come-ﬁrst served constraint) proposed by Diamond and
Dybvig (1983). That is, when a depositor who wants to withdraw comes to the bank
teller, the bank must pay any amount of cash on demand up to a preﬁxed amount of the
depositor’s account as long as it has a cash reserve; and when the bank runs out of the
cash reserve, the following withdrawers at the bank window cannot be paid cash, but
2Alternatively, we may be able to assume that the banks can sell their loan assets in the day market to
obtain cash to meet the demand of withdrawals. We do not assume, however, that the asset market opens
in the daytime for two reasons. First, because in this paper we focus on systemic banking crises in which
all banks in the system are subject to bank runs, we need to assume asset buyers who are outsiders of
the banking system. I suspect that assuming outside buyers would make the general equilibrium analysis
of the model unnecessarily complicated. Second, the eﬀect of asset sale is almost completely replicated
by the monetary policy or the Lender-of-Last-Resort lending, in which the central bank lends cash to
the banks taking their loan assets as collateral. Thus the behavior of the model with the asset market
should be the same as that with monetary policy described in Sections 3.4 and 4.2. To modify the model
so that banks can sell their loan assets is an agenda for future research.
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the sequential services constraint is the key driver of banking crises in our model.
Limited participation and payment intermediation: We assume that the day
market is divided by its nature into J submarkets that open sequentially. We call j-th
submarket the j-submarket for j = 1,2,··· ,J. Buyers and sellers are divided equally into
J groups and those in the j-th group can participate only in the j-submarket. Therefore,
each seller and buyer are allowed to participate only in one submarket during one day.
In each submarket, n/J sellers and (1 − n)/J buyers trade the intermediate goods. On
the other hand, each bank can participate in all of the J submarkets. In addition to the
record-keeping technology of the banks, this diﬀerence of market participation between
the banks and the other agents gives the banks a superior technology to intermediate
payment activities. If buyers hold cash during the day market instead of bank deposits,
the cash in this economy would be paid only once during one day. But if all agents
deposit their cash in their banks immediately after they obtain the cash, the cash is
withdrawn from a bank by a buyer at the beginning of the j-submarket, paid to a seller,
and deposited back in the bank (or another bank) by the seller at the end of the j-
submarket. Therefore, in the case where the banks intermediate payment activities, the
cash can be paid at most J times during one day. In the j-submarket, the buyers choose
the amount of withdrawal and the sellers choose whether or not to deposit their cash
revenue in their banks. Anticipating their choices, the banks decide their cash reserves
in the date-(t − 1) night market.
2.2 Optimization problem for banks
A bank chooses the deposits, Dt, the bank loans, Lt, and the cash reserve, Ct, in the
date-(t−1) night market. Dt earns the interest during the night and becomes (1+id)Dt
at the beginning of the date-t day market. A bank takes {ξ
(j)
t }J
j=1 as given, where if the
bank holds D
(j)
t units of deposits at the beginning of the j-submarket, the amount of








j=1 are determined as an equilibrium outcome by the actions of the buyers and
the sellers. We assume that a bank has no investment opportunities in the day market.
Therefore, the additional cash deposited in a bank in the j-submarket, ∆(j), should be
held by the bank as its reserve. The remaining deposits at the end of the day market is
D(J+1), which earns interest and becomes (1 + in)D
(J+1)
t at the beginning of the date-
t night market. Now we introduce an indicator of a banking crisis, ˜ 1, which satisﬁes
that ˜ 1 = 1 if depositors (i.e., buyers and sellers) decide to deposit their cash income
immediately in the banks (no bank runs) and ˜ 1 = 0 if they decide not to deposit (bank
runs).
Given i, id, in, {ξ
(j)
t }J







[ ˜ Rt + C
(J+1)




Lt + Ct ≤ Dt, (2)






t = Ct, (4)
D
(1)
t = (1 + id)Dt, (5)
˜ C(j) = max{C(j) − ξ(j)D(j),0}, (6)
C(j+1) = ˜ C(j) + ∆
(j)
t ˜ 1, (7)
˜ D(j) = D(j) − min{ξ(j)D(j),C(j)}, (8)
D(j+1) = ˜ D(j) + ∆
(j)






t , if ˜ 1 = 1, (10)
˜ Rt = (1 + i)Lt, (11)
where [a]+ = a if a ≥ 0 and [a]+ = 0 if a < 0. The nonnegativity of the bank’s objective
function is due to limited liability of the banks. As banks live for one period, they nat-
urally enjoy limited liability. If bank assets are impaired, banks default on their deposit
liabilities in the night market. Conditions (3) and (10) say that the banks are constrained
9by the reserve requirement, ρ, which is imposed by the government. We consider a sym-
metric equilibrium where ξ(j) = ξ for all j = 1,2,··· ,J, where ξ is determined later by
(60) as a result of optimizations of buyers and sellers in equilibrium.3 We assume that
the government determines the reserve requirement such that all withdrawers can get
paid the amount of cash they want to withdraw. Therefore, the government sets ρ = ξ.
Note that the government guarantees that the demandability of the deposits, that is
the depositors can withdraw at anytime on demand. The banks do not care whether or
not they can keep the promise of demandablility of deposits, but they maximize their
expected proﬁts. (It would be easy to modify the basic model such that the banks’ ob-
jective includes keeping the promise of demandability of deposits and/or that the banks
endogenously determine the ratio of cash reserves. We show an alternative model of the
banking sector in Appendix A, which follows the structure of banking operations ` a la
Freixas and Rochet [2008, section 8.2.1].)
Since the banks expect that ξ(j) = ξ for all j = 1,2,··· ,J, and (10) must be satisﬁed,




t. Therefore, if ˜ 1 = 1 (no bank runs), C(J+1) = C(J) = ··· = C(1),
D(J+1) = D(J) = ··· = D(1), and the bank’s problem is reduced to
max
Lt,Ct,Dt
[(1 + i)Lt + Ct − (1 + in)(1 + id)Dt]+ (12)
subject to
Lt + Ct ≤ Dt, (13)
































> 0, the bank can obtain an inﬁnite amount of
proﬁts by setting Ct = +∞. Since Ct cannot be inﬁnite in equilibrium, it must be the
3We show in Section 2.8 that a banking crisis never occurs in the basic model as long as in > 0. If a
banking crisis occurs, it would be the case that ξ
(j) = 1 for all j and ˜ 1 = 0.
10case that
(1 + id)(1 + in) = 1 + {1 − (1 + id)ρ}i, (16)
and the proﬁt for the banks is zero in equilibrium. Given the loan rate, i, any combination
of id and in can be the deposit rate as long as (16) is satisﬁed.4 We assume that the
government (or the central bank) determines id and the money supply, Mt+1. As shown
below in (54), the loan rate i is determined as γ+1 = Mt+1/Mt is set. Thus, we assume in
eﬀect that i and id are given by the central bank, whereas in is determined in competition
among banks by (16).
Credit creation: Banks expand their balance sheets by credit creation. In the date-
(t−1) night market, a bank lends cash to a borrower and the borrower deposits the cash
immediately into the bank or another bank; the cash redeposited is immediately lent to
another borrower and the new borrower also deposits the cash into some bank. This
process continues in the date-(t − 1) night market and the bank balance sheets expand
until the reserve requirement binds.
Instability due to credit creation: Since ρ = ξ ≪ 1, credit creation causes
the cash reserve to be less than deposits outstanding: C = ρ(1 + id)D ≪ (1 + id)D.
Therefore, if depositors want to withdraw all their deposits and hold cash during the day
market, only a small fraction ρ of depositors can withdraw cash. This is a bank run. The
unequal distribution of cash among depositors resulting from the bank run disrupts the
transactions of the intermediate goods and causes a huge loss of output, which reduces
the social welfare.
Broader interpretation of the model: The banking system in this model may
be interpreted as a simpliﬁed model of the ﬁnancial system in reality which consists of
broader ﬁnancial intermediaries, such as commercial banks, insurance companies, invest-
ment banks and hedge funds, which raise their funds by issuing short-term debt to ﬁnance
4Competition among banks implies that id and in do not vary among banks; otherwise depositors
change their banks in the middle of the day market.
11illiquid projects. For this interpretation we have just to rephrase “banks” in our model as
“investment banks” or “hedge funds” (or any other ﬁnancial intermediaries); “deposits”
as “short-term debt liabilities” of those ﬁnancial ﬁrms; “cash” as “liquid assets” in gen-
eral, such as cash, government bonds, and government-guaranteed bank deposits (from
the depositors’ point of view); and “bank loans” as “investments” in general, which are
illiquid and risky. In this line of interpretation, the banking crisis (or bank runs) in this
model may be regarded as a model of “ﬂight to quality” that was observed during the
2007-2008 ﬁnancial turmoil.
2.3 Social Welfare
Social welfare, Wt, is measured by the sum of the welfare of buyers and sellers. Note that
a buyer is endowed with one unit of the machine, k = 1. In a steady state equilibrium,
the social welfare is written as






+ U(x) − x. (17)
The ﬁrst-best allocation is determined by








where x∗ is the ﬁrst-best consumption and q∗ is the ﬁrst-best amount of the intermediate
goods per a buyer.
2.4 Sequence of decisions
The sequence of decisions during a representative date t is as follows. Sellers enter the
day market carrying cash, mds, and bank deposits, dds, as their assets, and bank loans,
ls, as their liabilities. Buyers enter the day market carrying cash, mdb, and bank deposits,
ddb, as their assets, and bank loans, lb, as their liabilities. Bank deposits earn interest so
that sellers have the right to withdraw (1+id)dds and buyers have the right to withdraw
(1 + id)ddb at any time during the day market. In the day market, sellers and buyers
12are allocated to J submarkets randomly. In the j-submarket, a seller produces qs units
of the intermediate goods and sells them to the buyers. Then, she chooses cash, mns,
and a bank deposit, dns, that she carries to the night market. A buyer buys qb units of
the intermediate goods and chooses cash, mnb, and a bank deposit, dnb, to carry to the
night market. In the night market, bank deposits grow to (1 + in)dns for a seller and
(1+in)dnb for a buyer, respectively. Bank loans grow to (1+i)ls for a seller and (1+i)lb
for a buyer, respectively. Production, trade, and consumption of the consumption goods
take place. Bank loans are repaid and bank deposits are paid out. All agents receive
lump-sum transfers (γt − 1)Mt and choose cash and bank deposits that they carry over
to date (t+1). In what follows, we look at a representative date t and explain backwards
from the night market to the day market.
2.5 The night market
A seller solves the following program:
Ws(mns,dns,ls) = max
x,h,m+1,d+1,l+1









+1) = h + ϕ{mns + (1 + in)dns − (1 + i)ls + (γt − 1)Mt}, (21)
where ϕ is the real value of cash in the units of the consumption goods. This program
can be rewritten as
Ws(mns,dns,ls) =ϕ{mns + (1 + in)dns − (1 + i)ls + (γt − 1)Mt}
+ max
x,m+1,d+1,l+1
[U(x) − x − ϕ(mds
+1 + dds
+1 − ls





The ﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs) are U′(x) = 1 and
ϕ ≥ βV s
m(+1), where if >, then mds
+1 = 0; if =, then mds
+1 ≥ 0; (22)
ϕ ≥ βV s
d (+1), where if >, then dds
+1 = 0; if =, then dds
+1 ≥ 0; (23)
ϕ ≤ −βV s
l (+1), where if <, then ls
+1 = 0; if =, then ls






+1) for x = mds
+1,dds
+1,ls
+1. The envelope conditions
imply that Ws can be written as





t is independent from the state variables.
A buyer solves the following program:
Wb(qb,mnb,dnb,lb) = max
x,h,m+1,d+1,l+1









+1) = h + ϕ{ak + wqb + mnb + (1 + in)dnb − (1 + i)lb + (γt − 1)Mt},
(27)
where k is the number of the machines, q is the quantity of the intermediate goods, and
a and w are the market prices of k and q, respectively. This program can be rewritten
as
Wb(mnb,dnb,lb) =ϕ{ak + wqb + mnb + (1 + in)dnb − (1 + i)lb + (γt − 1)Mt}
+ max
x,m+1,d+1,l+1
[U(x) − x − ϕ(mdb
+1 + ddb
+1 − lb





The ﬁrst-order conditions are U′(x) = 1 and
ϕ ≥ βV b
m(+1), where if >, then mdb
+1 = 0; if =, then mdb
+1 ≥ 0; (28)
ϕ ≥ βV b
d (+1), where if >, then ddb
+1 = 0; if =, then ddb
+1 ≥ 0; (29)
ϕ ≤ −βV b
l (+1), where if <, then lb
+1 = 0; if =, then lb
+1 ≥ 0. (30)
The envelope conditions imply that Wb can be written as





t is independent from the state variables. The buyers produce the consumption
goods competitively from k and q with the Cobb-Douglas technology, y = Ak1−θqθ.
14Since k and q are competitively traded in the night market, the prices are determined in
equilibrium by
ϕa = (1 − θ)A(qb)θ, (32)
ϕw = θA(qb)θ−1, (33)
since k = 1 and q = qb per buyer.
2.6 The day market
A seller solves the following program:
V s(mds,dds,ls) = max
qs,mns,dns −c(qs) + Ws(mns,dns,ls) (34)
subject to
mns + dns = pqs + mds + (1 + id)dds, (35)
mns ≥ 0, and dns ≥ 0. (36)
Equation (25) implies that this program can be rewritten as
V s(mds,dds,ls) = max
qs,dns ϕpqs − c(qs) + ϕ{mds + (1 + id)dds + indns − (1 + i)ls} + W
s
t





dns = pqs + mds + (1 + id)dds, (38)
mns = 0. (39)
Therefore, sellers deposit all cash including the cash they receive from the buyers, pqs,
into their banks immediately. The envelope conditions are V s
m = ϕ(1 + in), V s
d = ϕ(1 +
id)(1 + in), and V s
l = −ϕ(1 + i). These conditions and the FOCs for the night market
15imply that
ϕ ≥ βϕ+1(1 + in,+1), where if >, then mds
+1 = 0; if =, then mds
+1 ≥ 0;
(40)
ϕ ≥ βϕ+1(1 + id,+1)(1 + in,+1), where if >, then dds
+1 = 0; if =, then dds
+1 ≥ 0;
(41)
ϕ ≤ βϕ+1(1 + i+1), where if <, then ls
+1 = 0; if =, then ls
+1 ≥ 0. (42)
A buyer solves the following program:
V b(mdb,ddb,lb) = max
qb,mnb,dnb Wb(qb,mnb,dnb,lb) (43)
subject to
mnb + dnb + pqb = mdb + (1 + id)ddb, (44)
mnb ≥ 0, and dnb ≥ 0. (45)
Equation (31) implies that this program can be rewritten as
V b(mdb,ddb,lb) = max
qb,mnb,dnb ϕ{akt + wqb + mnb + (1 + in)dnb − (1 + i)lb} + W
b
t,
subject to mnb + dnb + pqb = mdb + (1 + id)ddb. In the case when in > 0, the following
holds obviously:
dnb = mdb + (1 + id)ddb − pqb, (46)
mnb = 0. (47)
The reduced form of the buyer’s program is
V b(mdb,ddb,lb) = max





pqb ≤ mdb + (1 + id)ddb. (49)
16The FOC is
(1 + in + λ)p ≥ w, where if >, then qb = 0; if =, then qb ≥ 0, (50)
and the envelope conditions are V b
m = ϕ(1 + in + λ), V b
d = ϕ(1 + id)(1 + in + λ), V b
l =
−ϕ(1 + i), where λ is the Lagrange multiplier for (49). These conditions and the FOCs
for the night market imply
ϕ ≥ βϕ+1(1 + in,+1 + λ+1), where if >, then mdb
+1 = 0; if =, then mdb
+1 ≥ 0;
(51)
ϕ ≥ βϕ+1(1 + id,+1)(1 + in,+1 + λ+1), where if >, then ddb
+1 = 0; if =, then ddb
+1 ≥ 0;
(52)
ϕ ≤ βϕ+1(1 + i+1), where if <, then lb




Conditions (42) and (53) imply that
γ+1
β ≤ 1 + i+1, where γ+1 = ϕ/ϕ+1 is the gross
inﬂation rate. The inﬂation rate, γ+1, is determined by the central bank. If the banks
set the loan rate i+1 such that γ+1/β < 1 + i+1, then ls = lb = 0 and the balance sheet
identity of the banks imply that Dt = Ct. Thus assuming that the banks prefer making
loans, the loan rate is determined by
γ+1
β
= 1 + i+1. (54)
Since (16) implies that 1 + in < 1 + i and (1 + in)(1 + id) < 1 + i, conditions (40), (41),
and (54) imply that
mds
+1 = 0, and dds
+1 = 0. (55)
In the equilibrium where the banks are operative, it must be the case that ddb > 0.
Therefore, (52) must hold with equality, implying that
λ+1 = ρi+1 > 0, (56)
17while (51) implies that mdb = 0, if id,+1 > 0. In this paper, we focus on the equilibrium
allocation for the case where id > 0. So, mdb = 0 in the equilibrium. Since i > 0 when
id > 0, it is the case that λ+1 > 0, and the liquidity constraint (49) binds. Therefore,
(1 + id)ddb = pqb. (57)
Therefore, mnb = dnb = 0, dns = pqs, and mns = 0, where qs = (1 − n)qb/n. Conditions





(1 + id)(1 + in)
. (58)





Since dds = 0, the total amount of bank deposits is determined by ϕDt = (1 − n)ϕddb.
Since mds = mdb = 0, all cash is held by banks as cash reserves: Ct = Mt. Condition
(14) implies that the real value of cash, z ≡ ϕMt = ϕCt is determined by z = (1 +
id)(1 − n)ρϕddb. Condition (13) implies that the total amount of loans is determined
by ϕLt = ϕnls + ϕ(1 − n)lb = (1 − n)(1 − ρ)ϕddb, while ϕls and ϕlb are indeterminate
in this basic model. Finally, the banks’ expectations on the withdrawals and redeposits
in the j-submarket are determined as follows. In j-submarket, the buyers withdraw
1
J(1 + id)(1 − n)ϕddb = 1
J(1 + id)ϕDt, which equals ξ(1 + id)ϕDt. The exact amount






As we assumed that the government sets ρ = ξ, it is the case that ρ = 1/J.
Social welfare with and without banks: It is easily conﬁrmed that the social
welfare of the economy with the banking sector is identical to that of the cash economy
without banks. This is because bank deposits serve as only a substitute for cash and
provide no additional value to the economy. Thus our simplistic model does not oﬀer a
18new theory for the raison d’ˆ etre of bank deposits, such as the liquidity insurance proposed
by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) or the optimal contractual design proposed by Diamond
and Rajan (2001) that disciplines bankers.
2.8 Possibility of a bank run due to a herd behavior
In the basic model in this section, the banks never become insolvent because they can
completely enforce loan repayment.
The case where in > 0 and id > 0: In this case, there are no bank runs. In a bank
run, all buyers would want to withdraw deposits and all sellers would want to hold cash
(No sellers would want to deposit their cash in the banks). For a seller, to hold the cash
she received from buyers (and not to deposit the cash in the banks) is never optimal
behavior. This is because the banks will surely repay the deposits in the night market
with strictly positive interest in > 0, since the bank insolvency never occurs. Therefore,
for a seller, depositing her revenue in a bank is strictly preferable to holding the revenue
in the form of cash, no matter what the other agents do. Therefore, a bank run never
occurs in this basic model with loan enforcement.
The case where in = 0 and id > 0: In this case, there is a possibility of bank runs
due to herd behavior. It may be the case that after the goods trade in the day market,
all sellers decide to hold cash rather than deposits. It is herd behavior but there is no
strategic complementarity between the decisions of one seller and the other sellers. A
seller, who chooses to hold bank deposits rather than cash, when all the other sellers
choose to hold cash, is not worse-oﬀ compared to another seller who chooses to hold cash
because both agents get exactly the same return in the night market. The nonexistence
of strategic complementarity between the sellers’ actions is a big diﬀerence of our basic
model from the Diamond-Dybvig model. Since i > 0 and id > 0, (1 + id)Dt = Mt/ρ =
JMt. Withdrawal is J times larger than cash reserve. If all sellers decide to hold cash,
buyers only in the 1-submarket successfully withdraw the full amount of their deposits.
The other buyers can withdraw no cash. If all sellers decide to hold cash, transactions
19of the intermediate goods occur only in the 1-submarket, while the other submarkets are
virtually shut down. The equilibrium output is basically the same as in the case of the
banking crisis in the models of Sections 3 and 4.
In the basic model, the central bank can prevent the occurrence of bank runs by
setting in > 0. There is no need of any other government intervention in our basic model
where we assume complete loan enforcement and no bank insolvency shock. Incidentally,
if i = id = in = 0, that is, if the Friedman rule is implemented, the ﬁrst-best allocation
can be attained in the basic model.
3 Bank Insolvency Shock
In this section we modify the basic model such that a macroeconomic shock hits the
economy in the night market with a small probability and the shock renders all banks
insolvent. In this section, we retain the assumption of complete loan enforcement, while
we discard it in the next section. In this section, we assume that the macroeconomic shock
destroys a portion of the bank assets after all bank loans are collected successfully. Note
that in the text of this paper we only analyze a banking crisis due to a macroeconomic
shock in which all banks are subject to runs. To modify our model for the case of
individual bank runs, in which some banks are subject to runs and others are not, it is
not diﬃcult and changes our results only slightly. We will modify our model and analyze
individual bank runs in Appendix B.
Macroeconomic shock: We assume that at the beginning of the date-t day market





1 with probability 1 − δ,
ω (< 1) with probability δ.
(61)
The variable ˜ ω indicates the condition of the bank assets in the date-t night market. After
the banks successfully collect loans, (1 + i)Lt, the banks are hit by the macroeconomic
shock, ˜ ω, and the bank assets, which are the consumption goods, are partially destroyed
20and become ˜ Rt = ˜ ω(1+i)Lt. We will show that when ˜ ω = ω < 1, a banking crisis occurs.
(Therefore, the probability of occurrence of a banking crisis is δ.)
Given α, which is the proportion of sellers who do not redeposit cash in the banks
during a banking crisis, the banks solve
max
Lt,Ct,Dt
(1 − δ)[(1 + i)Lt + Ct − (1 + in)(1 + id)Dt]+
+ δ[ω(1 + i)Lt + (1 + αin)Ct − (1 + in)(1 + id)Dt]+ (62)
subject to (13) and (14). Since the proﬁt of a bank is no less than (1 − δ)[(1 + i)Lt +
Ct − (1 + in)(1 + id)Dt]+, the requirement that the bank proﬁt must be ﬁnite implies
that (16) must hold in equilibrium. Since all sellers redeposit cash in the banks if and
only if ω(1+i)Lt+Ct ≥ (1+id)Dt, it is easily shown that α = 0 if ω ≤ ω < 1 and α = 1
if ω < ω, where ω = (1 − ρ)/(1 − ρ + in). Since (16) implies that in ≤ (1 − ρ)i, it is the





In what follows we assume that ω and i satisfy condition (63). In this case, when
˜ ω = ω, depositors in the date-t day market try to withdraw all their deposits and
nobody redeposits cash in the banks. Thus we say that a bank run occurs when ˜ ω = ω
with probability δ.
Stochastic environment: Since ˜ ω is revealed at the beginning of the date-t day
market, the sellers and the buyers in the date-(t − 1) night market must decide the
amounts of cash, bank deposits, and bank loans that they carry over to date t without
knowing the value of ˜ ω. We deﬁne the following random variables: ˜ Γ and ˜ Λ. ˜ Γ is
the probability that a depositor can successfully withdraw the full amount of her bank
deposit in the date-t day market, which is common to all agents, i.e., sellers and buyers.
˜ Λ is the proportion of demand deposits that are actually paid to a depositor in the date-t
night market, that is, if a depositor holds (1 + in)(1 + id)dt units of deposit in her bank
account, the amount she can ultimately obtain from her bank in the night market is





1 if ˜ ω = 1,






1 if ˜ ω = 1,
Λ (< 1) if ˜ ω = ω.
(65)
The values of Γ and Λ are determined as an equilibrium outcome. In what follows, we
explain the decision problems of sellers and buyers backwards from the night market to
the day market.
3.1 The night market
Note that ˜ ω and ˜ Λ are already revealed in the night market. A seller solves the following
program:
Ws(mns,dns,ls; ˜ Λ) = max
x,h,m+1,d+1,l+1









+1) = h + ϕ{mns + (1 + in)˜ Λdns − (1 + i)ls + (γt − 1)Mt}. (67)
The FOCs are the same as those in the basic model. The envelope conditions imply that
Ws can be written as
Ws(mns,dns,ls; ˜ Λ) = ϕ{mns + (1 + in)˜ Λdns − (1 + i)ls} + W
s
t. (68)
A buyer solves the following program:
Wb(qb,mnb,dnb,lb; ˜ Λ) = max
x,h,m+1,d+1,l+1









+1) = h + ϕ{˜ ak + ˜ wqb + mnb + (1 + in)˜ Λdnb − (1 + i)lb + (γt − 1)Mt}.
(70)
22The FOCs are the same as those in the basic model. The envelope conditions imply that
Wb can be written as
Wb(qb,mnb,dnb,lb; ˜ Λ) = ϕ{˜ ak + ˜ wqb + mnb + (1 + in)˜ Λdnb − (1 + i)lb} + W
b
t. (71)
The prices ˜ a and ˜ w are determined by (32) and (33), while qb in these equations, which
is the average amount of the intermediate goods per buyer, depends on the state of the
economy, ˜ ω.
3.2 The day market













where i indicates the state of the seller: n is the case of no bank run, in which δn = 1−δ
and ˜ ω = 1; s is the case where the seller succeeds to withdraw during a bank run, in
which δs = δΓ and ˜ ω = ω; and f is the case where the seller fails to withdraw during a
bank run, in which δf = δ(1 − Γ) and ˜ ω = ω.














n + mds + (1 + id)dds, (74)
mns
n ≥ 0, and dns
n ≥ 0, (75)
where pn is the price of the intermediate goods when i = n. Equation (68) implies that
this program can be rewritten as
max
qs,dns ϕpqs − c(qs) + ϕ{mds + (1 + id)dds + indns − (1 + i)ls} + W
s
t







n = pqs + mds + (1 + id)dds, (77)
mns
n = 0. (78)
Therefore, sellers deposit all cash including the cash they receive from the buyers, pqs,
in their banks immediately.














s + mds + (1 + id)dds, (80)
mns
s ≥ 0, and dns
s ≥ 0, (81)
where pω is the price when ˜ ω = ω. Equation (68) implies that this program can be
rewritten as
max
qs,dns ϕpqs − c(qs) + ϕ{mds + (1 + id)dds + {(1 + in)Λ − 1}dns − (1 + i)ls} + W
s
t
subject to dns ≤ pqs+mds+(1+id)dds. If a proportion α of sellers decide not to redeposit
their cash revenue, Λt = {(1 + i)ωL + C − αC}/{(1 + in)(1 + id)D − (1 + in)αC} ≤
{(1+i)ωL+C}/{(1+in)(1+id)D}. Since we assumed that (1+i)ωL+C < (1+id)D,




s = 0, (83)
mns
n = pωqs
s + mds + (1 + id)dds. (84)













f + mds, (86)
dns
f = (1 + id)dds + pωqs
f + mds − mns
f , (87)
mns
s ≥ 0, and dns






f + mds, (90)
dns
f = (1 + id)dds, (91)
The envelope conditions are V s
m = ϕ{1+(1−δ)in}, V s
d = ϕ(1+id)[(1+in){1−δ +(1−
Γ)δΛ} + δΓ], and V s
l = −ϕ(1 + i). These conditions and the FOCs for the night market
imply that
ϕ ≥ βϕ+1{1 + (1 − δ)in,+1}, where if >, then mds
+1 = 0; if =, then mds
+1 ≥ 0;
(92)
ϕ ≥ βϕ+1(1 + id,+1)[(1 + in,+1){1 − δ + (1 − Γ)δΛ} + δΓ],
where if >, then dds
+1 = 0; if =, then dds
+1 ≥ 0, (93)
and (42).













subject to budget and liquidity constraints for the respective states, where i indicates
the state of the buyer: n is the case of no bank run, in which δn = 1 − δ and Λn = 1; s
is the case where the buyer succeeds to withdraw during a bank run, in which δs = δΓt
and Λs = Λ < 1; and f is the case where the buyer fails to withdraw during a bank run,
in which δf = δ(1 − Γt).













n ≤ mdb + (1 + id)ddb, (96)
mnb
n ≥ 0, and dnb
n ≥ 0. (97)
Equation (71) implies that
dnb
n = mdb + (1 + id)ddb − pnqb
n, (98)
mnb
n = 0. (99)
Therefore, buyers deposit all remaining cash in their banks immediately.
Similarly, if i = s, equation (71) and the fact that (1 + in)Λ < 1 imply that
mnb
s = mdb + (1 + id)ddb − pωqb
s, (100)
dnb
s = 0, (101)
and if i = f,
mnb
s = mdb − pωqb
f, (102)
dnb
s = (1 + id)ddb. (103)
Therefore, buyers never redeposit their remaining cash in the banks when the bank
insolvency shock hits the economy.
Using these results and (71), the buyer’s program is reduced to





(1 − δ)ϕ{ank + wnqn − (1 + in)pnqn} + δΓϕ{aωk + wωqs − pωqs}
+ δ(1 − Γ)ϕ{aωk + wωqf − pωqf} + {1 + (1 − δ)in}ϕmdb






n ≤ mdb + (1 + id)ddb, (105)
pωqb
s ≤ mdb + (1 + id)ddb, (106)
pωqb
f ≤ mdb, (107)
26where an and wn are the prices when ˜ ω = 1, and aω and wω are those when ˜ ω =
ω. Denoting the Lagrange multipliers for (105), (106) and (107) by λn, λs and λf,
respectively, the FOCs are





















and the envelope conditions are V b
m = ϕ{1+(1−δ)in+λn+λs+λf}, V b
d = ϕ(1+id)[{1−
δ +(1−Γ)δΛ}(1+in)+δΓ+λn +λs], V b
l = −ϕ(1+i). These conditions and the FOCs
for the night market imply
ϕ ≥ βϕ+1{1 + (1 − δ)in,+1 + λn,+1 + λs,+1 + λf,+1},
where if >, then mdb
+1 = 0; if =, then mdb
+1 ≥ 0; (111)
ϕ ≥ βϕ+1(1 + id,+1)[{1 − δ + (1 − Γ)δΛ}(1 + in,+1) + δΓ + λn,+1 + λs,+1],
where if >, then ddb
+1 = 0; if =, then ddb
+1 ≥ 0, (112)
and (53).
3.3 Equilibrium
We assume that δ is suﬃciently small and satisﬁes




We assume and justify later that under condition (113), (111) holds with strict inequality
and (112) holds with equality.5 With this assumption, mdb = 0 in equilibrium, which
directly implies that qb
f = 0, since pωqb
f ≤ mdb. That is, when a banking crisis occurs,
5In general, either (111) or (112) should hold with strict inequality in equilibrium. This is because






db. Only when δ takes on a particular value, both (111) and (112) are satisﬁed
with equality.
27only buyers who successfully withdraw their deposits can buy the intermediate goods.
Therefore, total production of the intermediate goods in the case of a banking crisis is
Γ(1 − n)qb
s. The competition in production of the consumption goods implies ϕan =
(1 − θ)A(qb
n)θ, ϕwn = θA(qb
n)θ−1, ϕaω = (1 − θ)A(Γqb
s)θ, and ϕwω = θA(Γqb
s)θ−1. The
seller’s optimization in the day market implies ϕpn = c′(1−n
n qb
n) and ϕpω = c′(1−n
n Γqb
s).


















s = (1 + id)ϕddb, (115)
which determine qb
n and qb
s as functions of ϕddb. (112) can be rewritten as
γ+1
β







The equilibrium value of Γ is determined by Γ = C/{(1 + id)D} = ρ from (14). In
the steady state equilibrium, (42) or (53) hold with equiality. Thus the central bank
determines i by setting γ = Mt+1/Mt = ϕ/ϕ+1, since γ/β = 1 + i. As we assumed the
central bank determines id, in is also given by (16). Given these interest rates, conditions
(114), (115), and (116) determine ϕddb, qb
n, and qb
s. The total amount of bank deposits
is ϕD = (1 − n)ϕddb. Since all cash is held by the banks, the real balance is z = ϕMt =
(1−n)(1+id)ρϕddb. The total amount of bank loans is ϕL = {(1+in)ρ−1−1}z/(1+i) The
value of Λ is determined by Λ = (1+i)ωL/(1+in){(1+id)D−C} = (1−ρ+in)ω/{(1−
ρ)(1+in)}. Condition (63) guarantees that (1+in)Λ < 1. Given the equilibrium values
of these variables, we can prove that (113) is a suﬃcient condition for (111) holding with
strict inequality when (112) holds with equality. The proof is given in Appendix C.
Real damage due to banking crisis: Since the bank insolvency shock ω is an
exogenous shock, the loss of bank asset: (1 − ω)(1 + i)ϕL is an exogenous loss to the
economy, which is unavoidable once ω is realized. There is additional damage due to
a banking crisis. If a banking crisis occurs, only the proportion Γ = ρ = 1/J of the
total buyers can buy the intermediate goods and the total amount of the intermediate
28goods produced becomes (1 − n)ρqb
s instead of (1 − n)qb
n in normal times. The liquidity






















n), when c′(q) is strictly increasing




n = 1/3, that
is, the total production of the intermediate goods during the banking crisis becomes one
third of that in normal times. The subsequent gap in consumption goods production
is (1 − n)A{(qb
n)θ − (ρqb
s)θ}. This is the real damage of a banking crisis. In the case
where θ = 1/2, ρ = 1/9, and c(q) = q2, the real damage of a banking crisis is about
42% of the consumption goods produced in normal times. Note that the key factor that
generates this real damage of a banking crisis is the sequential service (ﬁrst come-ﬁrst
serve) constraint on depositors. If, as in Allen and Gale (1998), the banks can suspend
the withdrawals and give an equal amount of cash to all depositors (i.e., buyers), the
disruption in the goods market does not occur. This is because all buyers hold cash






n, it is easily shown from (117) that the price









= ϕpn. This result indicates that a banking crisis may induce deﬂation of
nominal prices. This is consistent with the historical episodes of banking crises, such as
Japan’s decade-long deﬂation and bank distress in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Boyd
et al. (2001) show empirical evidence from data of banking crises all over the world
that the inﬂation rate is lowered signiﬁcantly during a banking crisis. Their ﬁnding also
support our theoretical prediction that a banking crisis may lower the price level.
Friedman’s Rule: Note that the real damage due to banking crisis is made even in
the case where i = id = in = 0. This is because (117) implies that Γqb
s < qb
n as long
6I thank Franklin Allen for pointing out this feature of my model.
29as Γ < 1. The production of intermediate goods in normal times, (1 − n)qb
n, is larger
than the ﬁrst-best level and that in the banking crisis, (1 − n)Γqb
s, is smaller than the
ﬁrst-best level. Thus under the threat of banking crisis, Friedman’s rule cannot attain
the optimal allocation.
Lower loan demand during a banking crisis: It is often observed that the loan
demand of ﬁrms decreases during a banking crisis. Even though the nominal interest
rate had been set at almost zero for nearly a decade since 1995 in Japan, the banks
had diﬃculty ﬁnding (good) borrowers. We can explain this phenomenon by a slightly
modiﬁed version of our model. Suppose that there is a unit mass of merchants who live
only for one period: A merchant is born at the beginning of the date-t day market and dies
in the date-t night market. They maximize the proﬁt by buying the intermediate goods at
the price of p from the sellers and selling them at the price of p′ to the buyers. We assume
a technological constraint that sellers and buyers cannot trade directly and that sellers
can sell only to merchants and buyers can buy only from merchants. The merchants are
not endowed with cash or deposits, and they need to borrow cash, lm, at the beginning
of the day market. For simplicity, we assume that the merchants borrow cash from the
central bank at the loan rate ˆ i, so that the loan supply to the merchants is not aﬀected
by the bank runs. The problem for a merchant is maxq,lm p′q − (1 + ˆ i)lm subject to
pq ≤ lm. In equilibrium, p = (1 +ˆ i)p′ and lm = pq. The nominal amount of total loans
to merchants is Lm
ω ≡ (1−n)pωρqb
s in a banking crisis and is Lm
n ≡ (1−n)pnqb
n in normal
times. Since the collateral constraint for the buyers implies that (1 +ˆ i)pq = (1 + id)ddb,
it is easily shown that Lm
ω /Lm
n = (1 +ˆ in)ρ/(1 +ˆ iω), where ˆ in and ˆ iω are the short-term
rates in normal times and in a banking crisis, respectively. If ρ is small, even when
the central bank sets ˆ iω = 0, the loan demand decreases during a banking crisis, that
is, Lm
ω < Lm
n . This result can be interpreted as follows: When a banking crisis occurs,
the buyers cannot buy the intermediate goods because they run short of cash and the
production of the intermediate goods decreases; and the decrease in the demand of the
intermediate goods reduces the borrowing by the merchants for their working capital in
30the day market, which is perceived by the central bank as an overall reduction of loan
demand.7
3.4 Policy implications
There are several policies that are relevant to the banking crises.
Deposit insurance: Suppose that the government imposes a tax, which is propor-
tional to the amount of deposits, on the banks in the date-(t − 1) night market and
the tax revenue is kept as the deposit insurance fund. (We do not specify how the tax
proceeds are kept or invested during the night market.) When a banking crisis occurs
in the date-t day market, the government pays subsidies to the banks from the deposit
insurance fund. This is a simpliﬁed model of deposit insurance. This policy is not eﬀec-
tive to stop the bank runs as long as the negative shock is large, that is, ω is so small
that the amount of subsidy necessary to restore the solvency of the banks exceeds the
amount of the deposit insurance fund.8 In addition, there should be a tax distortion due
to the proportional tax on bank deposits.
Fiscal policy: When the buyers fail to buy the intermediate goods because of the
shortage of cash during a banking crisis, the government itself may be able to buy the
goods in the day market and sell them in the night market. This ﬁscal policy can support
the production of the intermediate goods, but it cannot restore the solvency of the banks
and cannot stop the bank runs. Thus the banking crisis continues and the banks run out
7I leave the construction of a full model with merchants for future research. It may be possible to
make a model such that the merchants live for inﬁnite periods and borrow from the private banks. The
similar declines of the loan demand in the banking crisis would be shown if we assume that when the
merchants buy the intermediate goods in the day market, they can buy them by credit with probability
π and pay cash for the material goods with probability 1 ¡ π. If π is large, it would be shown that the
merchants do not carry cash or bank deposits to the day market from the previous night market.
8If the deposit insurance fund is subsidized suﬃciently by the government, the bank runs may be
eﬀectively stopped. We classify, however, the injection of taxpayer money into the deposit insurance
fund as one form of the bank reforms to restore the solvency of banks, which we discuss later.
31of cash reserves. The government can issue cash to ﬁnance the ﬁscal policy in the day
market, which can be redeemed in the night market by selling the intermediate goods
to the buyers. No tax is necessary to implement this policy.9 The real damage of a
banking crisis is completely avoided by this policy, while almost all of the dead weight
cost, (1−ω)ϕ(1+i)L, is born by the unlucky buyers who could not withdraw cash during
the day market.
Suspension of convertibility: This policy may be interpreted in our model as
prohibiting withdrawal in the day market. This policy eﬀectively stops the runs of
depositors, while no buyers can buy the intermediate goods, since they cannot have cash
and the sellers only accept cash as a payment instrument. Thus pω = qb
s = qs = 0 under
the policy of suspension of convertibility. Therefore, this policy may amplify the real
damage of the banking crisis.
Monetary policy or Lender of Last Resort (LLR) lending: Suppose that in
the day market the central bank lends cash to the banks up to the value of the bank
assets, (1+i)ωL. This policy improve welfare by facilitating the trade of the intermediate
goods, but only partially. This is because LLR lending is lending of cash up to (1+i)ωL,
while the cash demand in the day market is (1 + id)D − C, where we assumed that
(1 + i)ωL < (1 + id)D − C (see the arguments that derive [63]). Since the LLR lending
does not restore the solvency of the banks, this policy cannot stop the bank runs and
all banks ultimately run out of cash reserves. At the beginning of the night market, the
banking sector has the remaining deposit liabilities of (1−ω)(1+i)L and the liability to
the central bank, ω(1 + i)L, while it has the loan asset of ω(1 + i)L. (Lucky depositors
withdraw (1 + i)ωL + C in total during the day market.)
9Note that p = w. This is because the government is not subject to a liquidity constraint and the
interest rate, in, is eﬀectively zero during the bank runs, since nobody wants to deposit money in the
banks.
32Bank reforms to restore the solvency of banks: If the government guarantees
that the bank deposits (or all bank liabilities in reality) are fully repaid in the night
market, there are no bank runs and the intermediate goods are produced just as much
as in normal times. Thus, the real damage of the banking crisis can be completely
eliminated by this policy. But the government incurs the cost to guarantee the bank
liability, which amounts to (1 − ω)(1 + i)ϕL plus the associated tax distortion if it is
ﬁnanced by distortionary taxes. This cost of the policy implementation may be much
smaller than the real damage of the crisis, especially when ρ is a small number. So,
government guarantee of bank liabilities may improve the social welfare signiﬁcantly.
There are several methods to implement this policy: for example, deposit insurance
without an upper limit, the blanket guarantee of the bank liabilities, and taxpayer-
funded capital injections to the banks. Whatever methods are taken, the government
should restore the public’s expectations in the solvency of the banks. This expectation
would be formed only if the true values of the bank assets are publicly known and the gap
between the banks’ liabilities and their assets is explicitly guaranteed or made up by either
government policy or capital augmentation in the market. Note that the counterpart,
in reality, of the bank deposit in our model may be not only the bank deposits but also
bonds and general debts issued by ﬁnancial institutions, such as investment banks and
hedge funds.
4 Incomplete Loan Enforcement and Collateral Constraint
In this section, we modify the basic model and assume that the banks cannot enforce the
repayment of the bank loans. We show that in the incomplete loan enforcement model a
banking crisis due to coordination failure can occur without any real insolvency shock.
Incomplete loan enforcement: We assume that in the night market, a borrower can
walk away without repaying the bank loan, and that the bank can seize the borrower’s
machine, k, if the repudiating borrower owns a machine, and sell the machine in the
market to recover (a part of) the loan. We also assume that the banks cannot impose
33any other penalty to repudiators than to seize their machines, if they own the machines.
Therefore, the bank loan must be secured by collateral, and the machines endowed to the
buyers are the only asset that can serve the role of the collateral. Under this environment
of incomplete loan enforcement, the bank loans of sellers and buyers made in the date-
(t − 1) night market must satisfy the following collateral constraint:
(1 + i)ls
t = 0, (118)
(1 + i)lb
t ≤ Et−1[atkt], (119)
where Et−1[ · ] is the expectation as of date-(t − 1). Since the sellers have no collateral-
izable assets, they cannot borrow the bank loans.
Sunspot shock: Similar to the model in Section 3, we assume that there is a macroe-
conomic random variable ˜ ω and at the beginning of the date-t day market the value of





1 with probability 1 − δ,
ω (< 1) with probability δ.
(120)
The diﬀerence from the model of Section 3 is that ˜ ω does not destroy any real resources
but it aﬀects the depositors’ expectations on the other depositors’ withdrawal decisions.
If ˜ ω = 1, all depositors believe that all sellers immediately deposit their cash revenue
in the banks in the day market, while if ˜ ω = ω(< 1), all depositors believe that no
sellers deposit their cash revenue in the banks and the banks run out of cash reserves in
the 1-submarket. Since ˜ ω aﬀects only the macroeconomic expectations, we can call it a
sunspot shock.
• When ˜ ω = ω, a banking crisis occurs and the production of the intermediate goods
is severely disrupted. We assume and justify later for a standard set of parameter
values that if ˜ ω = ω, the collateral value aωk becomes much smaller than the
outstanding debt, (1 + i)lb, in the night market and that the banks cannot collect
the full amount of the loans. In this case, the bank asset becomes (1−n)aωk, while
34the following relationship holds:
(1 − n)aωk < (1 + i)L. (121)
• We assume and justify later for a standard set of parameter values that if ˜ ω = 1,
the collateral value ank becomes larger than the outstanding debt, (1+i)lb, in the
night market and that the banks can collect the full amount of the loans. In this
case, the bank asset becomes (1 + i)L.
• We assume and justify later for a suﬃciently small value of δ that the collateral
constraint (119) does not bind in the date-(t − 1) night market.
• Unlike the basic model in Section 2, the withdrawal decisions among depositors
have the strategic complementarity ` a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983), because the
banking crisis induces the impairment of the bank assets, through declines of the
asset price from an to aω. Therefore, a depositor is worse-oﬀ if she redeposits cash
in a bank in the day market when all the other depositors withdraw cash. That is,
she can get paid only a small part of her bank deposit in the night market because
the bank asset decreases to (1−n)aωk (< (1+i)L) as a result of the banking crisis.
Given the sunspot shock ˜ ω, the banks solve
max
Lt,Ct,Dt
(1 − δ)[(1 + i)Lt + Ct − (1 + in)(1 + id)Dt]+
+ δ[(1 − n)aωk + (1 + in)Ct − (1 + in)(1 + id)Dt]+ (122)
subject to (13) and (14). Since the proﬁt of a bank is no less than (1−δ)[(1+i)Lt+Ct−
(1 + in)(1 + id)Dt]+, the requirement that the bank proﬁt must be ﬁnite in equilibrium
implies that (16) must hold in equilibrium.
4.1 Equilibrium
The optimization problems for sellers and buyers are identical to those in the model of
Section 3. Most of the conditions that determine the equilibrium values of cash holdings,
35deposits, and the quantity of the intermediate goods are identical to those in Section 3.
The only diﬀerence is that the value of Λ is endogenized in the model of incomplete loan
enforcement, while it is basically exogenously given by the value of ω in the model of
Section 3.
Λ is determined as follows: When ˜ ω = ω, the bank run occurs and the asset price
declines such that the collateral value, aωk, becomes less than the outstanding bank
debt, (1 + i)lb. The bank asset becomes (1 − n)aωk, while the remaining bank liability
is (1 + in){(1 + id)D − C} = (1 + in)(1 + id)(1 − ρ)(1 − n)ddb. Therefore, using Γ = ρ




(1 + in)(1 + id)(1 − ρ)(1 − n)ddb =
(1 − θ)Aρθ(qb
s)θ
(1 + in)(1 + id)(1 − ρ)ϕddb. (123)










Conditions (114), (115), and (124) determine ϕddb, qb
n, and qb
s, which in turn determine
Λ by (123). The other variables are determined similarly as those in Section 3.3.
Parameter values that justify our assumptions: We assumed that the collateral
constraint (119) does not bind in the date-(t − 1) night market and (121) holds if a
bank run occurs. We can show that if δ is suﬃciently small, these assumptions hold in
the case where θ = 1/2, ρ = 1/9, and c(q) = q2. Since δ is small, the value of ϕddb is
approximated by (59), the value in the basic model. Thus, (1+i)ϕL = (1−n)(1−ρ)ϕddb ≈
(1 − n)(1 − ρ)θA(qb





condition for (119) to be nonbinding is approximated by (1−ρ)θ < 1−θ, which holds for






ρ in the case where c(q) = q2 (see Section 3.3). Therefore, the condition
for (121) to hold is approximated by (1−ρ)θ > (1−θ)ρθ/2, which also holds for θ = 1/2
and ρ = 1/9.
36On the ﬁre sale of assets: In our model, there is no ﬁre sale of collateralized assets
(i.e., the machines, k) during a banking crisis. The downward spiral of asset prices due to
the ﬁre sale by ﬁnancial institutions is called the ﬁre-sale externality, which is arguably
the main rationale for banking regulation (see Brunnermeier, et al. [2009]). Although
the ﬁre-sale externality is not present in our model, it should be easily incorporated
in our model by some modiﬁcations, which we leave for future research. On the other
hand, as Brunnermeier, et al. (2009) point out, ﬁre sales should have been regarded as
good buying opportunities for professional investors and, therefore, should have ceased
soon spontaneously due to increased demand for the excessively cheap assets. Thus it
is a puzzle that the downward spiral of a ﬁre sale can continue to a considerable extent
and cause extensive damage to the economy. The mechanism of the asset-price decline
present in our model may give one possible explanation for why the agents expect that
the asset price will not pick up soon, but that it will continue to decline. (In the present
paper, the asset price declines during the banking crisis due to disruptions of trading of
the intermediate goods and the resulting decreases in productions of the consumption
goods, which are caused by bank runs.)
4.2 Policy implications
In the incomplete loan enforcement model, we have similar policy implications for the
banking crises as those in Section 3. A notable lesson of the incomplete loan enforcement
model is that the cost of bank reform to restore solvency may turn out to be small after
the policy is implemented, while it appears to be huge before the policy takes place. This
is precisely because the asset price responds positively to the policy.
Deposit insurance and suspension of convertibility: Similar arguments hold as
those in Section 3.4. The suspension of convertibility may amplify the severity of the
banking crisis.
Monetary policy or Lender of Last Resort (LLR) lending: Suppose that when
a bank run occurs in the day market the central bank lends cash to the banks up to the
37value of the observed bank asset, (1 − n)aωk. This upper limit is clearly insuﬃcient to
restore the normal production of the intermediate goods. The expected value of (1+in)Λ
when the policy is implemented stays below 1 and the depositors continue running on
the banks: At the beginning of the night market, the banking sector has the remaining
deposit of (1 + i)L − (1 − n)aωk and the liability to the central bank, (1 − n)aωk, and
the bank assets of (1 − n)aLk, where (1 + i)L > (1 − n)aLk and aL is the price of
machines under LLR lending. (It is the case that aL > aω, since the production of the
intermediate goods is increased by LLR lending.) Therefore, as long as the central bank
limits its lending to the value of bank assets, the bank runs cannot be stopped by the
LLR lending. Alternatively, if the central bank internalizes the positive eﬀect of the LLR
lending on the asset price and commits itself to lend up to (1 − n)aek, where ae is the
equilibrium price of the machines, then it is easily shown that in equilibrium ae becomes
an and the solvency of banks and the production are restored. In this case, the real
damage of the banking crisis is completely eliminated.
Bank reforms to restore the solvency of banks: If the government guarantees
that the bank deposits (or all bank liabilities in reality) are fully repaid in the night
market, there is no bank runs and the intermediate goods are produced just as much
as in normal times. Thus, the real damage of the banking crisis can be completely
eliminated by this policy. Moreover, the asset price rises in response to the increase of
the production of the intermediate goods. Before the policy is implemented, the observed
(or expected) asset price is aω and the banks appear to be insolvent. Therefore, the
cost for the government to guarantee the bank liabilities appears to be huge, which is
(1+i)L−(1−n)aωk. If the guarantee is implemented, however, the value of the collateral
rises to an, which satisﬁes (1 − n)ank > (1 + i)L. Thus, the banks restore their ability
to collect the full amount of their loans. Therefore, by the guarantee of bank liabilities,
the solvency of the banking system is restored and the government incurs no cost to
implement the guarantee ex post. This seems to be a relevant lesson for episodes of
banking crises. In many episodes of banking crises, the cost of the bank reform appeared
38to be incredibly huge in the midst of the crises, while the cost turned out ex post to be
considerably smaller than expected.
Fiscal policy: We can consider the same ﬁscal policy that we argued in Section 3.4.
If the government commits itself to this policy, a banking crisis never occurs. This is
because all agents expect that the banks will never be insolvent, even when the sunspot
shock hits the economy, since the asset price would become an even after a banking crisis
in response to the ﬁscal policy due to the same mechanism as above. Since a banking
crisis never occurs, there is no loss of social welfare compared with the case of no sunspot
shock. Therefore, the ﬁscal policy is a good policy to resolve the ﬁnancial crisis in this
model where the government can work as a perfect substitute for the buyers in the day
market. However, if we change the setting of the model slightly such that the government
can substitute for the buyers only imperfectly, it is shown that the ﬁscal policy cannot
restore the solvency of banks and cannot stop the bank runs. For example, suppose that
the government cannot maintain the intermediate goods properly, while the buyers can,
and therefore the intermediate goods purchased by the government perish completely at
the beginning of the night market. In this setting, the price of machines stays at aω
regardless of the ﬁscal policy. The ﬁscal policy cannot restore solvency of the banks nor
the production of the consumption goods, while the amount of the intermediate goods
produced can be restored completely. In this case the ﬁscal policy cannot improve the
social welfare once the economy is hit by a banking crisis.10
Implications for the global ﬁnancial crisis: In reaction to the current crisis,
which began in the US in early 2007 and then spread all over the world, policy debates
10More precisely, the ﬁscal policy does not improve the total amount of social welfare, but it redis-
tributes wealth from buyers to sellers: Since the government cannot preserve the intermediate goods, it
cannot sell them in the night market and needs to ﬁnance the ﬁscal policy by taxes. Suppose that the
lump-sum tax is available and the government imposes the same amount on each buyer and seller. In
this case the government gives wealth to sellers by purchasing the intermediate goods in the day market,
while it takes away the cost from both buyers and sellers in the night market. Thus in eﬀect, the ﬁscal
policy just transfers wealth from buyers to sellers.
39are now dominated by arguments about the eﬃcacy of recovery eﬀorts that have been
and are now undertaken: that is, extraordinary monetary easing, massive ﬁscal stimulus,
and bank reforms aimed at restoring the solvency of the ﬁnancial system. The policy
implications from our stylized model give some basis for judging these policy options.
As we saw above, monetary easing may not be able to stop the ﬁnancial crisis as long as
central banks provide only liquidity but do nothing to restore the solvency of the ﬁnancial
system. The demand stimulus from the ﬁscal measures may be a good policy to stop
the crisis and restore market conﬁdence and the solvency of the banking system only if
governments can eﬃciently work as substitutes for the liquidity-constrained ﬁrms (i.e.,
buyers) in the chains of production in private economies. As is most likely, if governments
are ineﬃcient substitutes for the private buyers, neither market conﬁdence nor solvency
of the ﬁnancial system can be restored and the ﬁscal stimulus will fail to stop the further
deterioration of the crisis. What may be most necessary are the bank reforms aimed
explicitly at restoring the solvency of the ﬁnancial system, which entail decisive policy
initiatives for stringent asset evaluations of ﬁnancial institutions, all-out disposals of bad
assets, and suﬃcient capital augmentations by either private investors, taxpayer money,
or both.
4.3 Extension of the model: Productivity shock and the business cycle
As the Lagos-Wright monetary model is embedded in a standard business cycle model
by Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2006), the incomplete loan enforcement model in this
section can be also embedded in a standard business cycle model. In the integrated
model, a slight change in the productivity can generate a large economic downturn
due to the occurrence of a banking crisis: Suppose, as usual in standard business cycle
models, that the productivity parameter A of the production function of the consumption
goods is subject to stochastic shocks. Suppose also that the shock to A is revealed at
the beginning of the day market. If a macroeconomic shock lowers A below a certain
threshold value with probability δ, the banks become insolvent and the banking crisis
occurs. The banking crisis abruptly reduces the production of the intermediate goods and
40does the economy extensive damage. Therefore, a (small) shock in the productivity, A,
can induce a considerable ﬂuctuation in the economic activities through the occurrence
of a banking crisis. This feature of the model may be useful for further understanding of
the ampliﬁcation mechanism of business cycles and the current global ﬁnancial crisis.
5 Conclusion
We proposed a new model for policy analysis of banking crises based on the monetary
framework developed by Lagos and Wright (2005). The model is tractable and easily
embedded into a standard business cycle model. The model naturally makes a dis-
tinction between money and goods, while most of the existing banking models do not.
This distinction enables us to clarify further the workings of banking crises and crisis
management policies.
The bank deposit is deﬁned as an asset that substitutes for cash, which is necessarily
demandable. We assume that in the model only cash is accepted as a payment instru-
ment in transactions of the goods in the day market. The bank deposits accelerate the
circulation of cash and facilitate payment activities and transactions of the goods. A
bank run disrupts the circulation of cash and consequently reduce the output severely
through a reduction in transactions of the goods.
We may be able to use this framework to compare the eﬃcacy of ﬁscal stimulus,
monetary easing, and bank reforms as recovery eﬀorts from the current global ﬁnancial
crisis. Our model shows that monetary easing is not suﬃciently eﬀective to stop bank
runs unless the policy resolves the bank insolvency, and that ﬁscal stimulus can neither
restore market conﬁdence nor solvency of the banking system as long as the government
is an ineﬃcient substitute for liquidity-constrained buyers. A notable policy lesson is that
the bank reforms to restore the solvency of the banking system (through, e.g., taxpayer-
funded capital injections, or the blanket guarantee of bank liabilities by the government)
may be optimal as a recovery policy from a banking crisis. Moreover, although the cost
of bank reforms appears to be incredibly high in the midst of the banking crisis, it may
turn out to be considerably small once the policy is implemented because the asset price
41responds positively to the policy and the higher asset price may restore the solvency of
the banking system.
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A Alternative speciﬁcation of banking sector
In this appendix we outline a model of the banking sector that can be regarded as an
alternative to the speciﬁcation in Section 2.2. For simplicity, we assume that in = 0 and
that the bank’s objective function is zero when a bank run occurs: Banks maximize their
proﬁts only in the state of no bank runs and they do not care about the state of bank
runs.
Following Section 8.2.1 of Freixas and Rochet (2008), we assume that in the case
of no bank runs the net amount of withdrawal during the day market (i.e., the sum
of withdrawals in J submarkets minus the sum of new deposits in J submarkets) is an
idiosyncratic random variable for a bank and when it runs short of reserve, the bank can
borrow cash from the central bank or the interbank market at a penalty rate, ip. We
assume that the bank can earn interest at the rate of ir (< id) by depositing the reserve
with the central bank. These assumptions imply that the proﬁt of a bank may be strictly
positive. Thus we also assume in order to limit the size of the bank assets that the banks
incur convex cost for managing the deposits, c(ϕD), where c′(·) > 0 and c′′(·) > 0. We
assume that if the bank proﬁt is strictly positive, the bank eats all the proﬁt when it is
liquidated in the night market. In this case, the banks solve the following problem and
43endogenously determine the amount of reserves, C, given i, id, ir, and ip:
max
L,C,D






subject to L + C ≤ D, where ρ ≡ C/D, x is the net withdrawal divided by the deposit,
and f(x) is the probability density function of x with the support of −∞ < x ≤ 1. Note





where Φ(ρ) = i − id − (id − ir)ρ − ip
[∫ 1
ρ (x − ρ)f(x)dx
]
. As Freixas and Rochet (2008)








The central bank can implicitly determine ρ (> 0) by deciding ir and ip such that
0 ≤ ir < id < ip. If the total amount of cash in the economy (deposited with the central
bank) is determined by the cental bank, the deposit rate, id, is determined in equilibrium
such that the demand for deposits by depositors equals the supply of deposits by banks.
As we argue in the text, the loan rate, i, is determined in equilibrium by monetary policy,
i.e., the money growth rate. This alternative model of banking sector is compatible with
the optimizations by sellers and buyers in the text.
B Idiosyncratic shock, bank runs, and contagion
In this appendix, we modify the model of Section 4 (The incomplete loan enforcement
model) such that idiosyncratic shocks can induce bank runs. In this model we also show
that a run on one bank can naturally induce a contagion of bank runs.
B.1 Setting
We modify the model of Section 4 as follows. There are three major changes.
44First, the shock ˜ ωt is an idiosyncratic shock to banks. Each bank i receives an
independent shock ˜ ωi,t, which takes on the value of 1 with probability 1−δ and ω (< 1)
with probability δ. Therefore, the ratio 1−δ of banks are not subject to runs, while the
ratio δ of banks are hit by bank runs in equilibrium.
Second, we assume that the borrowers of bank i are the depositors of the same bank.
That is, a buyer who borrows from a bank deposits the borrowed money into the lender
bank. (If a borrower deposits the borrowed money into another bank, idiosyncratic shock
can induce contagion of bank runs. See Section B.3.)
Third, we assume that the intermediate goods, q, must be installed and combined with
the machine during the day market. A buyer who bought q units of the intermediate
goods can install only q units of the goods into her machine. Therefore, in the night
market, a buyer can sell her machine together with the installed intermediate goods,
q. The intermediate goods, q, and the machines, k, cannot be sold separately in the
night market. We also assume that there exists q (> 0) such that the production of the
consumption goods from the machine is y = Aqθ if q ≥ q and y = 0 if q < q. The value
of a machine with q is y in the night market. If a buyer fails to buy the intermediate
goods in the day market, then her machine can produce nothing in the night market.
The most important consequence is that a bank cannot recover its bank loan from the
borrower if she is a buyer who failed to buy q (≥ q) in the day market, because the value
of her collateral is zero and she can walk away leaving the worthless collateral in the
hands of the bank. The collateral constraint (119) is changed to
(1 + i)lb
t ≤ Et−1[y] (125)
B.2 Equilibrium
When a shock hits a bank, ρ (= 1/J) depositors of the bank can withdraw and buy q,
while 1−ρ depositors cannot withdraw and fail to buy q. Because of the third assumption
we made above, the value of the machines becomes zero for the depositors who failed
to withdraw. Since the depositors are the borrowers of the same bank (the second
assumption) and the machines are the collateral for their bank loans, the bank becomes
45insolvent due to the bank run. This is because the collateral value of the machines
becomes zero for 1 − ρ depositors and the bank cannot recover their loans in excess of
the value of their collateral. Therefore, the sunspot shock, ˜ ω, induces a self-fulﬁlling
bank run that renders the bank insolvent.
The optimization problems and the equilibrium conditions are quite similar to those
in Sections 3 and 4. There are only several changes: Replace ˜ ak + ˜ wqb in (70) and (71)
with A(qb)θ; Replace ank+wnqn with ϕ−1Aqθ
n, aωk+wωqs with ϕ−1Aqθ
s, and aωk+wωqf
with ϕ−1Aqθ








ϕp!qs in (109). Note
that (110) implies that the following relationship holds







For a suﬃciently small δ, (111) holds with strict inequality, and (112) holds with equality.
Therefore, mdb = qb
f = 0. Since shocks are idiosyncratic, the equilibrium price p is unique
and the liquidity constraints imply that qb
s = qb
n ≡ qb (and qb
f = 0). Λ is determined by
Λ =
ρA(qb)µ









The values of variables are determined similarly as those in Section 4 by these conditions.
B.3 Contagion
By relaxing the second assumption in Section B.1, we can easily show that bank runs
are intrinsically contagious, that is, a run on one bank naturally causes a run on another
bank. We assume for simplicity of exposition that there are only two competitive banks
in the economy, bank 1 and bank 2. We consider a symmetric case in which the sizes
of bank loans, deposits and cash reserves are identical between the two banks. We
change the second assumption in Section B.1 to one where all depositors of bank 1 are
the borrowers of bank 2 and vice versa. Suppose the sunspot shock hits bank 1 and
depositors start running on bank 1. The public expectation is that only ρ (= 1/J)
depositors can successfully withdraw and buy q, while 1 − ρ depositors fail to withdraw
46and cannot buy q. Since the depositors of bank 1 are the borrowers of bank 2, the
run on bank 1 generates the public expectation that bank 2 becomes insolvent. This is
because the collateral value becomes zero for 1 − ρ borrowers of bank 2. Anticipating
the insolvency of bank 2, the depositors of bank 2 also start running on bank 2. The
bank run on bank 2 in turn renders bank 1 insolvent because the depositors of bank 2
are the borrowers of bank 1. Thus, the sunspot shock on bank 1 induces bank runs on
both banks and makes both banks insolvent in a self-fulﬁlling way.
The above case is a very stylized example of contagion among bank runs. This model
implies that in general a run on one bank can trigger various types of contagion leading
to other bank runs, depending on the structure of the ﬁnancial network or the way in
which the borrowers of a particular bank deposit their borrowed money in that bank or
other banks.
C On the condition for ±
We prove that (113) is a suﬃcient condition that (111) holds with strict inequality when
(112) holds with equality. It is suﬃcient to show that the right-hand side (RHS) of (111)
is strictly smaller than the RHS of (112). The RHS of (111) is written as (1−δ)(wn/pn)+
δ(wω/pω), while the RHS of (112) is (1+id)[(1−ρ)(1+in)δΛ+(1−δ)(wn/pn)+δρ(wω/pω)].

















Note that this condition does not depend on the value of Λ and therefore it is the




















n, a suﬃcient condition for (129) is that the RHS of (129) is strictly larger
than 1, which is equivalent to (113).
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